Three Flashpoints to Watch 🔥

Good morning. 

Welcome to a very late DCDR Research report for February 22, 2024

Why so late?

The DCDR analysis engine is working very well (honestly, it’s way better out of the box than I had anticipated). So, I’ll normally let the model do most of the work and I don’t need to add any commentary.

However, there are times when otherwise tenuous things feel like they’re converging. And even though the analysis model is very good in the near term, these are some longer-term threads, so some commentary is necessary. 

This week was one of those times. 

I apologize that I’ve been dithering over these assessments all week because I was worried that I was being overly pessimistic. (Plus, it took me 36 hours to write the piece on Israel.)

But that worry disappeared earlier today when I started seeing some of the events I thought might happen, happening. 

So, here are three things that I’m tracking as potential flashpoints.

A Confident Putin

• Putin continually stressing to Tucker Carlson that Russia had no territorial interest in Poland while painting Warsaw as a potential aggressor. 

• Reported troop movements on Russia’s northwest border with the Baltic States.

• Sabotage in Estonia and placing Prime Minister Kallas on a ‘most wanted list.

None of these events are enough by themselves to raise the alarm, but together, these sound like Putin is making a case for potential action in Poland or the Baltic states. These statements and actions mirror activity seen prior to the Russian invasions of Crimea and Ukraine.  

Previously, there was a sense that Putin would not want to open up additional fronts while the fighting in Ukraine drags on. But three recent events have likely emboldened Putin and may suggest a faster timeline.

• The Russian advance into Avdiivka after months of stalemate is a significant victory for Russia in Ukraine.

• The blockage of aid to Ukraine by Republicans in the US Congress is significantly weakening Ukraine. (And even if aid is approved, it may prove to be too late as Russia may carry the momentum from Avdiivka into the spring.)

• Former President Trump's comments questioning the value of NATO and seemingly inviting Putin to take action against Europe. 

Again, none of these alone would be enough to change the situation, but together, these will have increased Putin’s confidence. The very public murder of Alexei Navalny feels like a show of strength.

This confidence might lead him to test NATO’s resolve over Eastern Europe and the Baltics sooner rather than later. And what better time to pressure NATO than during a contentious and noisy election in the US? 

That’s not to suggest a full-on invasion is imminent or even likely in the short term. However, increased sabotage, sightings of ‘little green men’, and trumped-up claims of ethnic Russians being persecuted are more likely as Russia starts fraying at NATO’s borders.

Israel: Engagement on Three Fronts?

There is no way out of the current situation in Gaza. 

Over 100 hostages remain unaccounted for, negotiations seem to have stalled, and almost 30,000 Palestinians are dead while an estimated 1 million people are crammed into Rafah, the last part of Gaza not under Israeli control. Hamas is very unlikely to meet the Ramadan* ultimatum for the return of all hostages because 1) they will get nothing in return and 2) it is very unlikely that all of the unaccounted-for hostages remain alive, given the length of captivity and the conditions in Gaza since their abduction. (*The holy month of Ramadan will begin around March 10th.)

So what then?

An assault on Rafah will result in very high numbers of casualties and potentially drive a large number of civilians to force their way through the border into Egypt (which is already quietly preparing for this on their side of the border). Taking Rafah would leave Israel in control of Gaza but no better off: many hostages would still be unaccounted for, Hamas would still be able to conduct an insurgency campaign, and there would be a growing humanitarian catastrophe among Gaza’s civilians, plus accusations of a second nakba: that Israel forced Palestinians into Egypt.

These issues are well-known to the Israeli war cabinet and military, but it’s hard to see how they will, or could change course now. Things will get worse and there is no plan for what comes next.

Meanwhile, there are two other sources of friction. 

The West Bank 

Until this morning, the West Bank had been surprisingly quiet during the assault on Gaza. Increased settler violence and likely access restrictions to the Dome of the Rock around Ramadan will exacerbate things over the next few weeks and I expect we will see more attacks like the shootings that took place on Thursday morning. 

The likely enormous death toll and charges of a second nakba after an assault on Rafah make a third intifada a real possibility. 

Lebanon

Israel is striking targets in Syria and Lebanon and is engaging Hezbollah along the Israel / Lebanon border where Israel has already evacuated a large number of its citizens. 

Sporadic strikes against Hamas targets in Beirut may be tolerated as an extension of the conflict in Gaza, but increased attacks on Hizbollah and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisors are a significant escalation. While Iran backs Hamas, it is much closer to Hezbollah, meaning that a confrontation with Hezbollah has a much greater chance of drawing in Iran than the fighting in the south does. Plus, Hezbollah is a much more capable conventional fighting force than Hamas.

Both of these situations - the West Bank and Lebanon - could easily spiral, committing Israel to fighting on two fronts while dealing with much greater instability in the West Bank. 

Meanwhile, although neither the US nor Iran wants to get drawn into direct conflict, neither can stand by if open warfare breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah. Each party may feel that these attacks and responses are being carefully calibrated to avoid an escalation, but it wouldn’t take much to upset this delicate balance.

Importantly, while this is notionally related to October 7th and the subsequent invasion of Gaza, any conflict with Hezbollah would build a momentum and rationale of its own, meaning that even a ceasefire in Gaza would not eliminate the tension in the north.

Note that none of this is to suggest that Israel should have done nothing in response to the horrific attacks of October 7th - that was one of the worst terrorist attacks we have ever witnessed. But the military campaign has not only failed to defeat Hamas and recover the hostages, but it has left Israel extremely exposed. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of civilians are dead, wounded and traumatized in Israel and Gaza and we have no plan — and in some cases no interest — to care for them.

Houthi Control of the Red Sea is Here to Stay

What started as attacks in solidarity with the people of Gaza have taken on a life of their own. The Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea have given them control over the fastest shipping route to and from Europe and have drawn the US, European, and even Canadian and Australian forces into the fight.

This is a classic asymmetrical conflict where the cost to the Houthis is relatively low, while the benefit to them is significant. 

So why would they stop? 

Iran has some influence as a backer of the group but this is nowhere near the kind of control needed to get the attacks to end.

My sense is that 1) these attacks are no longer linked to what is happening in Gaza, so a ceasefire would have no effect, and 2) these can be turned off and on with relative ease. 

The upshot is that there’s no easy or quick resolution to this issue, meaning that shipping diversions will continue well into 2024. (Latest)

I realize this makes for pretty grim reading, but these are three areas where things could deteriorate significantly or, in the case of the Red Sea, go on for much longer than we might have expected. Hopefully, putting these onto your radar will help you plan and act accordingly.

All my best

~Andrew

PS - Before you dive into the comments, keep in mind that the assessment of what I think will happen, is not an expression of what I hope will happen. And please read the disclaimers before you make any decisions.